Monetary System and Independence of Central Bank

The conditions for the political independence of the Central Bank are to determine the procedure for appointing members of its governing body or manager (president), approval of the decision taken by the bank by the government and (or) parliament.
Economic independence is expressed in the fact that the Central Bank is not obliged to automatically issue money to the government to finance public spending and to give it preference in granting loans. In addition, for the economic independence of the Central Bank, the nature of its control over the credit system is important: the use of administrative (direct) non-market control methods, involving government intervention in bank decision-making, impairs the latter’s autonomy.
Factors affecting the independence of Central Banks are:
- state participation in the capital of the Central Bank and the distribution of profits;
- the procedure for the appointment (selection) of the bank management;
- the degree of reflection in the legislation of the goals, functions and tasks of the Central Bank;
- The government’s right to intervene in monetary policy;
- rules governing the possibility of direct and indirect financing of public spending by the Central Bank of the country;
- the relationship between the Central Bank of the country and the government.
Independence of the Central Bank does not exclude its informational transparency to the public, but, on the contrary, assumes it. After all, if the Central Bank really has independence, its transparency cannot hurt it.




LIST OF USED SOURCES

1. Glazyev S. The role of the Central Bank in the economic crisis: problems and solutions // Economic Renaissance. - 2014. - № 4. - P.23.
2. Petrova O. M. Features of the relationship of the central bank with the state and executive authorities // Law: current trends: materials of the III Intern. scientific conf. (Krasnodar, February 2016). - Krasnodar: Novation, 2016. - P. 57-59.
3. Sheremeta S. Century Central Bank. Its functions and policies // Innovative education and economics. - 2014. - Vol. 1, No. 11 (22). - P. 7-11.
Sheremeta S. Century Central Bank. Its functions and policies // Innovative education and economics. - 2014. - Vol. 1, No. 11 (22). - P. 8.
Petrova O. M. Features of the relationship of the central bank with the state and executive authorities // Law: current trends: materials of the III Intern. scientific conf. (Krasnodar, February 2016). - Krasnodar: Novation, 2016. - P. 58.
Glazyev S. The role of the Central Bank in the economic crisis: problems and solutions // Economic Renaissance. - 2014. - № 4. - P.23.









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