The Iran Nuclear Deal at Four: A Requiem?

Second, both the U.S. and Europe should ensure that the Iranian people have access to humanitarian goods.Thirdly, Iran, the USA and other countries should strive to reduce the risk of regional exacerbations. Fourth, the United States should consider reducing its military presence in Iraq; Iran wants the US troops to leave the Middle East.Under an even narrower version, the US could suspend key non-oil sanctions and restore civil nuclear waivers, in return for Iran agreeing not to ramp up its nuclear program beyond its current status and, possibly, reversing one or more of its breaches, as well as halting aggressive behavior in Iraq or the Gulf.Even in the absence of cooperation with the United States, Europe must strive to save the deal by resorting to DRM. European officials say this is intended to try to persuade Iran to resume compliance with the terms of the deal. Europe has an important role to play in this matter, both as a party to the JCPOA and as the creators of the INSTEX mechanism designed to mitigate the impact of US sanctions. At a minimum, EU should immediately launch INSTEX in order to maintain humanitarian trade with Iran and encourage more European stakeholders to join the mechanism. Restraint by Tehran, also conveyed to its local allies, could help avoid a conflict that all sides say they are keen not to spark.For their part, European states should consider creating a core group of states ready to encourage and help the Gulf states in organizing a collective dialogue on regional security on controversial issues. The very existence of such a mechanism could reduce the risk of accidentally entering the war, opening new channels of communication and creating a trust measure between these governments. Another idea would be for Washington and Tehran to consider creating a canal to eliminate conflicts, especially to combat potential clashes in and around the Strait. Finally, recent protests in Iran have led to a sharp awareness of the need for financial and political reforms in this country, regardless of the impact of sanctions.In the apparent success of US “maximum pressure” strategy lie its pitfalls: while it has inflicted significant harm to Iran’s economy, it has neither produced a stronger nuclear deal nor tempered Iran’s policies in the region. Instead, in addition to bringing both sides to the brink of war, it has produced the opposite: an Iran that is more aggressive in the region, more assertive in expanding its nuclear activities and as willing as ever to suppress dissent at home.The JCPOA may well be the next victim of the US-Iran confrontation. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the agreement could survive the additional steps on the part of Iran in order to reduce its observance to the present and until the November US elections amid growing tension between the rest of the JCPOA parties and in the region. Its collapse could trigger an international crisis of spread and make the restoration of the status quo even more difficult. The priority today is to conclude a tactical de-escalation deal that saves the deal, minimizes the risks of regional confrontation, and possibly opens the way to wider negotiations.