Reunification of the Korean Peninsula: current trends, challenges and prospects.
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INTRODUCTION 2
CHAPTER 1. SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA: EXPERIENCE OF UNIFICATION OF STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEMS 7
1.1. The split of the Korean Peninsula: causes and consequences 7
1.2. The policy of the Republic of Korea and the DPRK in the unification process: a comparative analysis 10
CHAPTER 2. SCENARIOS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA 14
2.1. The process of unification of South and North Korea through “hard” power (military conflict) 14
2.2. Political-diplomatic settlement of the Korean territorial problem: a united Korea as a confederation 16
CHAPTER 3. UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND THE ROLE OF KEY GLOBAL COUNTRIES IN THIS PROCESS 19
3.1. The role of the world community in solving the problem of unification of the Korean states 19
3.2. Obstacles, prospects and paths to realizing the unification of the Korean Peninsula 23
CONCLUSION 27
LIST IF REFERENCES 29
However, the actual White House policy on the Peninsula shows opposition to popular movements in the South in the second half of the twentieth century. and the actual desire for separation. Such policies caused separate political processes in North and South Korea, which in turn led to tragedy for the Korean people and turned the Korean Peninsula into a potentially explosive hot spot.Taking China's growing influence on the peninsula and its implications for regional security into account, the United States is forced to abandon its wait-and-see approach to unifying the Korean Peninsula. Of all the reunification scenarios described in the work, maintaining the status quo on the peninsula (with a nuclear-free North Korea) is the best option for Washington. A war launched by North Korea with little or no notice is considered a worst-case scenario. Of course, in this case, the advantages will remain with the US-South Korea alliance, but the scale of the casualties and the associated humanitarian crisis will be catastrophic for all participants, including the United States.Despite the lack of short- and medium-term interest in promoting reunification, in the longer term the United States seeks a unified, stable and democratic Korea that would act as a White House ally in its international course; advocate for the spread of a free market economy throughout the peninsula; strive for denuclearization of the peninsula. However, at least over the past several decades, policies applied to achieve these goals have been inconsistent and sometimes even contradictory. At the same time, the prospects for the real possibility of implementing US national interests on the peninsula are quite vague. If events remain on their current course, the rise of China is likely to usher in a dramatic change in the strategic security landscape of Northeast Asia, possibly leading to the formation of a US-led maritime bloc with Japan as a critical partner. This bloc will be balanced by an alliance between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, which will have a better chance of winning over a united Korea. In order to return the initiative to Washington's hands, prove to South Korea that the United States is a better option for a long-term alliance than China.The United States can achieve an advantage over its main opponent (PRC) if it offers serious financial support for the possible future restoration of a unified Korea. By committing significant resources, the United States could demonstrate a transparent, long-term, and enduring commitment to reunification. Sharing a border with North Korea in the Russian Far East, Moscow has no interest in a war on the peninsula or the collapse of Pyongyang and therefore maintains the status quo. In the longer term, Russia sees reunification as an opportunity to restore its strategic importance to the region and reap economic benefits. To realize such opportunities, Moscow is pursuing a carefully formulated two-Korea policy, supported by significantly strengthened economic partnerships with both the ROK and the DPRK. From a security perspective, the optimal outcome of reunification for Russia looks like a neutral or autonomous Korea, with which Moscow could maintain independent relations without looking back at Beijing and Washington. It is worth understanding that such a scenario is highly unlikely. The worst-case scenario for Russia is a nationalist, nuclear-armed Korea closely linked to China. Thus, and with some post-Cold War irony, Russia favors a unified Korea that keeps the United States and China off the peninsula. Such a resolution of the problem is beneficial not only for the national security of Moscow, but also for its economy, since it would allow the Russian Federation to implement two major economic projects: the construction of a transnational oil and gas pipeline through North Korea to supply Japan and the Republic of Korea and the construction of the Trans-Korean railway connected to the Trans-Siberian rail system, offering the enticing prospect of rail links between a unified Korea and lucrative European markets.To sum up, Russian Federation is interested in the formation of a sovereign single neutral and nuclear-free state on the peninsula, which neither the North, nor the South, nor their partners on the world stage are ready for.For China, North Korea serves as a strategic buffer against the US-NATO alliance. Beijing is thus committed to the perpetual existence of North Korea and, despite external support for the peace process, has little interest in actual reunification. Unification as a result of military action would be the worst outcome for China, since it could result in a united Korea serving as a US ally in a region that is strategically important to Beijing. In addition, such a scenario could lead to increased Japanese influence in the region. At the same time, Beijing will have to deal with the expected influx of North Korean refugees and the immediate redirection of South Korean investment away from China to rebuild the North. It is therefore not surprising that China remains committed to an uncertain status quo on the peninsula. The cost of maintaining the current situation is quite high for the Celestial Empire, since Beijing is forced to provide full support to Pyongyang (the PRC is the largest trading DPRK, the main and practically the only supplier of humanitarian and food aid, and the largest exporter of North Korean-made goods). However, the cost of maintaining the status quo is much less than the costs that the PRC might incur in the event of its worst-case scenario for the reunification of the ROK and the DPRK.It is reasonable to assume that fairly developed bilateral ties between the two states will continue in the future. The PRC and the DPRK have several common features, including ideology, border territory and developed economic relations. China, based on its own geopolitical and geostrategic interests, fears aggression against the DPRK and is not interested in the unification of Korea under the leadership of the United States. On the other hand, China seeks reunification with Taiwan, which makes it impossible for it to openly oppose the unification of the two states located within the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the only acceptable option for the unification of the DPRK and the ROK for China will be Korean neutrality with an unspoken pro-Chinese position. 3.2. Obstacles, prospects and paths to realizing the unification of the Korean PeninsulaCurrent problems of Korean unification can be divided into two groups: political and economic factors.Politically, the main obstacle to the unification of North and South is the North Korean political elite, which fears the loss of its own influence in the event of unification. The erasing of the borders between the ROK and the DPRK and freedom of movement throughout the entire Korean Peninsula will allow residents of the northern part to evaluate the standard of living of the southerners, which may cause sharp discontent, and as a result, the complete overthrow of the North Korean government. Economic difficulties are caused by the almost zero performance of the North Korean economy; today almost half of the DPRK population is employed in the shadow sector of the economy. The technical equipment of most enterprises is outdated, and the country has problems with electricity and transport communications. In addition, Pyongyang’s external debt is also significant, which in the event of unification will become a common problem. In April 2020, parliamentary elections were held in the Republic of Korea, which ended in the victory of the ruling Democratic Party, on which Pyongyang pinned its hopes on restarting the peaceful dialogue between the South and the North. At the end of the presidential elections, the Seoul administration announced that the normalization of relations with the DPRK would maintain the status of a priority task. However, the situation in the world put the South Korean leader Moon Jae-in in a difficult position; the key to his victory was not the issue of inter-Korean resolution, but the effective fight against the pandemic and its consequences. Today, unrest regarding the spread of COVID-19 has begun to play a lesser role in the political life of the ROK; the central task of the government is economic problems that have intensified due to the pandemic, as well as corruption scandals involving people close to Moon. This leads to the fact that the issue of inter-Korean settlement is postponed indefinitely. Seoul is rightfully afraid of the high material costs that the country will incur if it unites with the North; this could exclude the Republic of Korea from global competition for a long time. Pyongyang, in turn, is not ready to be swallowed up by the South. The North Korean elite is well acquainted with the German experience, when the capitalist West crushed the socialist East, as a result of which the residents of the GDR were assigned the status of “second-class citizens”, and its political elite was persecuted. The involvement of various international forces in it also plays a major role in resolving the issue of unification. Thus, Russia is interested in the formation of a sovereign single neutral and nuclear-free state on the peninsula, which neither the North, nor the South, nor their partners on the world stage are ready for.The United States prefers maintaining the status quo on the peninsula to the peaceful unification of the ROK and the DPRK. Washington benefits from maintaining tension as a tool for maintaining and expanding its own presence in Northeast Asia.China is considering the issue of unifying Seoul and Pyongyang in the context of its own confrontation with the United States. Beijing will support the merger only if the newly formed state adheres to a pro-Chinese course. There are no objective guarantees of this; the development of events after unification in relation to the PRC can develop in two scenarios. In the best case scenario for Beijing, a unified Korea will become a strong independent state, claiming regional leadership and maintaining partnerships with the White House. At worst, the new Korea will become an outpost of Washington’s containment of the PRC in the region, similar to Japan.Japan is expressing concern about the nuclear issue; Tokyo will support unification only if the peninsula is completely denuclearized. In fact, the Japanese fear the unification of Korea as a fact of the emergence of a strong competitor in the struggle for regional leadership.This situation allows us to conclude that it is premature to discuss the issue of the merger of the Koreas; today, states are faced with the task of formalizing an effective dialogue. The Korean War, which began in 1950, has not yet ended. The Korean crisis represents one of the main threats to global security and stability; it is formed from a combination of two problems: the division of the Korean nation into two separate states opposing each other and Pyongyang's nuclear program. It is worth understanding that these problems exist in interdependence, but at the same time they affect each other to varying degrees. Thus, the DPRK's renunciation of nuclear weapons will not stop the process of confrontation between North and South, while resolving the problem of unification is the key to solving the nuclear threat.CONCLUSIONWithin the framework of the research the following questions were analyzed the problem of unification and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the evolution of the views of Seoul and Pyongyang on issues of reunification, as well as the role of key international actors (USA, RF, China) in resolving the Korean crisis, which has grown from regional to international. Based on the research done, the following conclusions can be drawnTo start with, the enthusiasm for Korean reunification that was evident throughout the 1990s has waned, primarily due to the resilience of the North Korean regime, which has been able to survive international sanctions and isolation. An obstacle to unification is the enormous cost of reunification. None of the discussed scenarios envisage immediate reunification, and it is likely that the status quo on the Korean Peninsula will remain for the foreseeable future. Also, the strategic security landscape on the peninsula, and by extension throughout Northeast Asia, will largely depend on what policies regarding reunification will be pursued by key powers in the region and beyond.. Moreover, the United States now faces the clear possibility of tilting a unified Korea toward Beijing. To regain the initiative and reverse the current situation, the United States must develop a realistic policy with the long-term intention of maintaining Seoul as an ally. In the short term, the first step in this direction could be to improve the effectiveness of negotiations on Korean issues and resolve some of the problems that are currently fueling anti-American sentiment in South Korea. Such actions should be followed by open discussions with Seoul about the nature and type of post-unification alliance, with parallel efforts to establish and maintain constructive dialogue with Pyongyang.In the mean time China adheres to the necessary denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, opposing measures that could lead to a collapse in the DPRK. The consequences of the use of military force on the peninsula will negatively affect the politics and economy of the PRC, which views North Korea as a strategic buffer. It is important for Beijing to maintain a balance between its goals of maintaining an ally in the region (if North Korea is absorbed by South Korea, Washington will dominate the peninsula) and denuclearization. One way or another, China will play a significant role in resolving this problem.Also, Russia today is making some notable efforts in order to ensure its security and gain access to the significant economic opportunities that the possibility of uniting the ROK and the DPRK brings. Thus, Moscow maintains the status quo, and if reunification occurs, Russia will prefer a united, autonomous Korea, independent in its international course from Beijing or Washington.
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